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Abstract
Malaria eradication raises many economic, financial and institutional challenges. This paper reviews these
challenges, drawing on evidence from previous efforts to eradicate malaria, with a special focus on
resource-poor settings; summarizes more recent evidence on the challenges, drawing on the literature on
the difficulties of scaling-up malaria control and strengthening health systems more broadly; and explores
the implications of these bodies of evidence for the current call for elimination and intensified control.
Economic analyses dating from the eradication era, and more recent analyses, suggest that, in general, the
benefits of malaria control outweigh the costs, though few studies have looked at the relative returns to
eradication versus long-term control. Estimates of financial costs are scanty and difficult to compare. In the
1960s, the consolidation phase appeared to cost less than $1 per capita and, in 1988, was estimated to be
$2.31 per capita (both in 2006 prices). More recent estimates for high coverage of control measures suggest
a per capita cost of several dollars.
Institutional challenges faced by malaria eradication included limits to the rule of law (a major problem
where malaria was concentrated in border areas with movement of people associated with illegal activities),
the existence and performance of local implementing structures, and political sustainability at national and
global levels. Recent analyses of the constraints to scaling-up malaria control, together with the historical
evidence, are used to discuss the economic, financial and institutional challenges that face the renewed call
for eradication and intensified control.
The paper concludes by identifying a research agenda covering:
 issues of the allocative efficiency of malaria eradication, especially using macro-economic modelling to
estimate the benefits and costs of malaria eradication and intensified control, and studies of the links
between malaria control and economic development
 the costs and consequences of the various tools and mixes of tools employed in control and eradication
 issues concerning the extension of coverage of interventions and service delivery approaches, especially
those that can reach the poorest
 research on the processes of formulating and implementing malaria control and eradication policies, at
both international and national levels
 research on financing issues, at global and national levels.
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Background
The recent call for malaria elimination and, ultimately,
malaria eradication raises many technical challenges [1].
However, the economic, financial and institutional chal-
lenges are at least as great. Economic challenges include
analysing the level of investments appropriate for elimi-
nation programmes and in areas where intensified control
is the only feasible option [2], and evaluating the relative
return from investments in elimination and control, ver-
sus investments in other health interventions. Financial
challenges include calculating the likely financial cost in
terms of total cost and who pays, and putting in place
funding mechanisms that can ensure the long-term sup-
port that will be vital if initial investments are not to be
wasted. Institutional challenges are very diverse but
involve the strength of the structures of state needed to
ensure implementation, such as the rule of law (vital
where malaria is concentrated in border areas with move-
ment of people associated with illegal activities), the exist-
ence and performance of local implementing structures,
and political sustainability at national and global levels.
The aims of this paper are threefold:
1. to review the evidence on the economic, financial and
institutional challenges of previous efforts to eradicate
malaria, with a special focus on resource-poor settings;
2. to summarize more recent evidence concerning these
challenges, drawing on the literature about the difficulties
of scaling-up malaria control and strengthening health
systems more broadly;
3. to explore the implications of these bodies of evidence
for the current call for elimination and intensified control.
A rapid literature review was undertaken of both historical
and contemporary evidence on the economics and financ-
ing of eradication and control in resource-poor settings.
Although what was termed eradication would now be
called elimination, the word 'eradication' is retained here
when reporting findings. Resource-poor settings are
defined as those which historically or currently have lim-
ited physical and financial resources available to invest in
malaria control, where the infrastructure of health services
is limited, and where state capacity to implement health
programmes is weak. Economic studies were identified
from four previous reviews [3-6]. These were supple-
mented by a search in March 2008 for all relevant papers
published up to that date, using four electronic databases
(Pubmed; BIDs; ID21; HEED) and either MeSH terms
where available (eradication, economic evaluation, cost/
cost analysis, malaria) or text searches including the terms
malaria and eradication, elimination, in combination
with cost*; benefit*; effective*; econom*. References of
identified papers were reviewed iteratively for further rel-
evant studies. These searches related to economic and
financial aspects were supplemented by historical litera-
ture on the institutional challenges faced by malaria erad-
ication campaigns, and by contemporary evidence on
constraints to scaling-up malaria control and health serv-
ices more broadly, based on recent reviews [7,8].
Below the evidence is addressed in turn on the economics
of eradication/control, on the financial costs, and on the
institutional challenges. The paper concludes by present-
ing a research agenda.
Economic analysis
Economic analysis of malaria control dates back as far as
1916, with a study documenting the economic impact of
malaria on tenants on a Louisiana plantation [9]. For
most of its early history, however, this type of studies can
be characterized as anecdotal, often carried out to lobby
the authorities to take action against the disease, or even
to serve commercial or political interests, rather than to
inform policy makers on efficient resource allocation [3].
When the 8th World Health Assembly (WHA) launched
the Global Malaria Eradication Programme (GMEP) in
1955, there was almost no documented evidence of the
likely programme costs, nor analysis of the economic
return from implementation. In 1958, the programme
director wrote that eradication programmes were often
initiated without adequate planning and cautioned
against embarking on eradication attempts without full
consideration of the necessary resources [10]. Dr. Pam-
pana expressed his concern that spraying would be
required over larger areas and for longer periods than ini-
tially estimated to break transmission, and that eradica-
tion programme costs would be higher than expected.
Since then, a variety of studies have been produced on the
costs and consequences of what were called 'malaria erad-
ication campaigns'. In selecting these for review, a distinc-
tion can be made between evaluations that aim to assess
the overall value of a programme or strategy on economic
grounds, referred to as allocative efficiency, and evaluations
that consider the most technically efficient intervention for
pursuing these. For the former aim, cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) is the most appropriate tool, as it allows for direct
comparisons, in monetary terms, of costs and benefits.
This is especially important for a disease like malaria
which has been shown to have not just detrimental health
effects but also adverse consequences for economic devel-
opment [11-13]. CBA can, at least in theory, encompass a
broad range of both health and non-health related conse-
quences including, for example, the benefits of improved
educational capacity associated with reduced transmis-
sion, and the impact of this on productivity [12]. Techni-
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cal efficiency can be examined through cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA), which can assess both the return in health
terms to investments in different interventions, and the
relative desirability of different approaches to delivering
malaria prevention and treatment [14].
The focus of this review is on the former question, relating
to the allocative efficiency of eradication campaigns and
intensive control. Three methods are found in the litera-
ture for assessing their value. The most common approach
is an assessment of a particular programme's costs and
benefits; these are then summarized using a measure such
as a benefit-cost ratio (BCR). Alternatively, the costs of an
eradication campaign are compared to the alternative
costs of long-term malaria control, with or without the
inclusion of health outcomes. Lastly, assessments can be
made at the level of the whole economy, either of the
macro-economic impact of malaria control, or of the eco-
nomic burden that malaria places on the entire economy.
In relation to the latter, although this can then be com-
pared to the costs of control or eradication, this compari-
son is often left implicit. Table 1 lists the studies, and
where relevant their BCRs, in alphabetical order.
Cost-benefit analysis
In the years following the launching of the GMEP, a lim-
ited number of studies were carried out to evaluate
national eradication and control programmes. Although
the GMEP died out in 1969, along with the hopes of
achieving global eradication, further evaluations were
produced where the prospect of local elimination
remained. Initially, the framework used by most of these
evaluations was a CBA. In line with the dominant eco-
nomic evaluation approach at the time [15], benefits were
usually valued in terms of the human capital approach,
and focused on benefits of malaria control in terms of
increased labour supply and, hence, productivity and agri-
cultural output (termed 'indirect benefits'), and reduced
treatment costs (termed 'direct benefits').
The variety of settings and control measures, and the
methodologies used in the evaluations, produced widely
differing, though generally favourable, benefit-cost ratios,
with the lowest being 1.9 and the highest 146 (Table 1).
Moreover, since these analyses were primarily concerned
with benefits of increased labour supply, they undoubt-
edly underestimated the benefits, which should also
include the value of health gains per se and reduced suffer-
ing.
These studies were predominantly prospective, estimating
likely costs of control and using information on the inci-
dence of malaria and the workdays lost to estimate bene-
fits. Even if studies used actual control costs, benefits were
usually extrapolated based on known or estimated reduc-
tions in cases and deaths and an assumed relationship
with increased agricultural output. In contrast, Mills [16]
undertook a retrospective assessment of the relationship
between the malaria eradication programme of Nepal and
changes in economic indicators that might have been
affected.
Historical evidence on Nepal sheds vivid light on the per-
ceived dangers of malaria in the Terai area [17]. Malaria
control started in 1955, and by 1968 only a few thousand
cases were being detected annually. Control was subse-
quently maintained, though at a rather high level of cases.
The research sought to track, from 1955 to 1985, both
expenditure on malaria control and changes in the supply
and productivity of labour, capital and land, as well as
non health-related investments made in opening up new
land for cultivation.
Table 2 summarizes the estimates of the gains and losses
associated with malaria control, expressed per hectare of
land; losses are relevant since many of the benefits were
derived from migration, and allowance needs to be made
for any losses in the source areas of migrants. The cost of
malaria control (around Rs 25 per hectare per year) was
insignificant compared to the returns to land and labour
of new settlement (several thousand rupees per hectare),
even taking into account non-health investment costs and
losses in other areas. While it is impossible to rule out the
possibility that pressure on land would have forced migra-
tion, even in the absence of malaria control, this would
have been at a high cost in terms of morbidity and mor-
tality, at least until deforestation and cultivation had
made the environment less favourable for the main forest-
dwelling vector and produced some measure of environ-
mental control.
After the 1980s, cost-benefit analysis dropped out of fash-
ion for a long time. The only recent CBA is that done by
Mills and Shillcutt [6]. Following the recent approach of
converting cost-effectiveness ratios to monetary values by
applying a decision-maker's willingness to pay value to
health gains, they drew on the cost-effectiveness literature
to estimate the costs and averted DALYs of high coverage
of a package of malaria control measures, and then calcu-
lated the BCRs by assuming a year of life gained is worth
one per capita income. The resulting BCR for the interven-
tion package was 17.1. This is likely to be an overestimate,
since the health gains were derived from efficacy and
effectiveness trials, which are likely to have more favoura-
ble results than in real life, and the costs probably allowed
inadequately for system-strengthening costs. However,
even given these caveats, the BCR is favourable.
Beside these cost benefit analyses, there is quite a large
body of literature on the economic burden of malaria
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Table 1: Benefit/cost ratio (BCR) documented in the literature for eradication and control programmes.
Source Country Focus of study Design BCR
Barlow and Grobar (1986) 
[45] quoting Sudan (1975) 
[46]
Sudan Control programme No information 4.6
Cohn (1973) [19] India Anti-malarial programmes Comparison of expenditure on control 
and eradication phases
NA
Griffith et al. (1971) [47] Thailand Chemopro-phylaxis Comparison of benefits in terms of 
increased tungsten ore production and 
costs of chemoprophylaxis
6.5
Khan (1966) [48] Pakistan Cost of malaria Estimated direct and indirect costs of 
malaria compared to cost of eradication 
programme
4.9
Livanadas and Athanassatos 
(1963) [49]
Greece Eradication Likely benefits due to morbidity and 
mortality avoided and, hence, improved 
agricultural output and economic 
performance and treatment costs avoided 
compared to eradication costs
17.3
Mills (1993) [16] Nepal Eradication Retrospective analysis comparing costs of 
control with likely gains from economic 
development
Not calculated
Mills and Shillcutt (2004) [6] Sub-Saharan Africa Intensified control Estimates of macro-economic benefits 
from (1) Gallup and Sachs and (2) 
McCarthy et al compared to control costs
4.7 (1)
1.9 (2)
Mills and Shillcutt (2004) [6] Sub-Saharan Africa Intensified control through 
package of interventions
Micro-economic analysis based on CEA 
evidence; costs compared to benefits 
estimated by valuing averted DALYs
17.1
Najera et al*(1993) [50] Sri Lanka Eradication Macro-economic model of economy, 
tracing impact of control of malaria
146
Niazi (1969) [51] Iraq Eradication Estimated direct and indirect costs of 
malaria compared to cost of eradication 
programme
6
Ortiz (1968) [52] Paraguay Eradication Cost of eradication compared to 
estimated agricultural productivity gains
2.5–3.6
Ramaiah (1980) [53] India Control programme Actual expenditure on control and 
eradication compared with likely economic 
benefits 
(reduction in direct and indirect costs)
2.4
Ruberu (1977) [20] Sri Lanka Intensive control aimed at 
eradication versus long-term 
control
Likely costs of eradication compared to 
direct and indirect costs of malaria
NA
*BCR calculated by [45] using data from [23]. NA: not applicable. Source: adapted and updated from [4].
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[12]. While using the human capital approach to valuing
the costs of malaria, it differs from CBA by calculating
losses due to malaria not the benefits of control, and by
not including the costs of control in the analysis. A typical
study of this type is that by Shepard et al [18], which
summed total household and government expenditure on
malaria treatment and productivity losses related to
malaria morbidity and mortality based on costing from
four African countries, and extrapolated to estimate the
total burden of malaria in Africa, producing a total cost of
1.1 billion USD [18]. Chima, Goodman and Mills [12]
critiqued the findings of this and similar analyses, demon-
strating their shortcomings in adequately evaluating the
true costs of malaria to the economy, notably the over-
estimation of the productivity losses associated with
uncomplicated malaria, and the underestimation of the
economic burden of severe malaria[12]. Factors such as
the impact of malaria on long-term educational attain-
ment and subsequent productivity were also excluded.
Cost comparisons
The second approach used to evaluate eradication cam-
paigns is the comparison of their costs to those of ongoing
control. Cohn [19] used this approach to evaluate the
Indian eradication programme in the late 1950s. This
approach was particularly relevant given the argument put
forward by WHO and adopted by the Indian government,
that a high investment in the short run on an eradication
campaign would be more economical than long-term
annual investment in control. By comparing the expected
costs of a 10-year eradication campaign to an annual con-
trol programme run for 30 years, Cohn demonstrated that
the cost of eradication can be higher than that of control,
depending on the discount rate used for adjusting future
expenditure to its present value. In the Indian context, at
a discount rate above approximately 10%, control
appeared to be the more economical option.
Health outcomes were not included in the analysis,
though Cohn did discuss the consequences of eradication
in terms of reduced morbidity and increased fertility lead-
Table 2: The value of gains and losses associated with malaria control in Nepal (1980 prices).
Category Gains Losses
Marginal product of land Max. of Rs 1,300 per ha and probably rather 
less
Marginal product of settlers Approx Rs 2,700 per ha
Loss of marginal product of land in source 
areas of migrants
Unknown but probably small
Loss of marginal product of settlers in source 
areas
Approx Rs 1,200
Loss of marginal product of forested land Minimum of Rs 220–400 per ha of agricultural 
land gained
Cost of malaria control Average of Rs 25 per ha per year of control 
programme
Cost of agricultural investment Rs 63–110 per ha per year
Ecological damage Unknown
Gains and losses of indigenous population in 
settlement areas
Unknown Unknown
Increased output and productivity of 
indigenous population
Small
Costs associated with larger population Only to a small extent attributable to malaria 
control
Nepali Rs 16.46 = £1 (1980). Source: [16]. Tab.2.7. from Chp.2 "The Impact of Malaria Control on the Economic Development of Nepal" by Anne 
Mills from "Health Economics Research in Developing Countries" By permission of Oxford University Press.
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ing to rapid population growth, particularly in the
younger, economically-dependent age groups, and its
possible detrimental effects on the economy. He also
argued that the proposed reduction in morbidity and the
contribution of this to the economy was overstated, due to
unsound methodologies, and that most of the potential
gains had already been reaped through routine control.
In contrast, Ruberu's estimates for Sri Lanka suggested
that the costs of a high short-term investment on eradica-
tion would be exceeded both by the costs of long-term
control, and by the productivity losses if no action were to
be taken [20]. Ruberu allowed for the need to switch to
higher-cost insecticides given the likely development of
resistance with prolonged spraying programmes.
Most recently, Jackson, Sleigh and Liu [21] described the
costs associated with the malaria control programme in
Henan, China, where reported malaria cases had dropped
from over 10 million in 1970 to 318 in 1992. Henan
achieved the consolidation or 'basic elimination' phase in
the following year. Much of this reduction has been attrib-
uted to the use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs), which
almost eliminated the primary vector, Anopheles anthro-
pophagus [22]. The support to the use of ITNs, however,
was discontinued in the early 1990s due to financial con-
straints, and since then a number of outbreaks had
occurred with the number of annual cases ranging in the
thousands.
The Henan study provides estimates for both government
expenditure on malaria control – approximately $0.03 per
person protected – and for the income losses and treat-
ment costs for patients with suspected malaria – just over
$4 (in 2002 USD). The authors did not estimate a BCR or
evaluate the case for further investment to pursue full
elimination. They did however conclude that discontinu-
ing the malaria control programme would likely result in
considerably higher costs.
Macro-economic analysis
The third approach to assessing the value of malaria erad-
ication is by evaluating the impact of malaria on the econ-
omy as a whole. This methodological approach can be
justified as the most appropriate of all three, given the per-
vasive effects of malaria on an economy [13]. The first
such evaluation was Barlow's analysis of the economic
impact of near-eradication of malaria in Sri Lanka [23].
His macroeconomic model produced a positive impact on
output in the first decade, but, in the long term, the
growth of output would be outstripped by the growth of
the population, reducing income per capita. However, the
demographic consequences of both malaria and malaria
eradication has been an issue of considerable controversy
in Sri Lanka [24,25].
Two more recent studies have assessed the overall burden
malaria places on the economy by assessing its impact on
rates of economic growth. Gallup and Sachs [26] used
malaria as an explanatory variable in an economic growth
model. Their results suggested that countries with 'inten-
sive' malaria grew 1.3% less per person per year, and a
reduction of 10% in malaria was associated with 0.3%
higher growth. McCarthy, Wolf and Wu [27] did similar
estimations, but allowed for two-way causality between
morbidity and economic growth rates. This resulted in a
lower estimate: a 0.25% per year reduction in economic
growth and far greater variability in results across coun-
tries.
Neither study matched these economic growth estimates
with control costs. However Mills and Shillcutt [6]
applied the relationship between malaria and economic
growth to estimate the increased annual economic growth
rate associated with a 50% reduction in the malaria bur-
den (the Abuja target), and then calculated the BCRs by
comparing the gain in national income to the costs of
high levels of coverage of a package of malaria control
measures. BCRs of 4.7 and 1.9 suggested that malaria con-
trol was a good investment.
Financial costs
The historical evidence on the financial costs of eradica-
tion and intensified control is rather thinner than the eco-
nomic analysis literature reviewed above. It is also
difficult to summarize, given that costs depend greatly on
the stage of the programme – whether the costs relate to
the initial attack phase or to the consolidation phase.
However, some idea can be obtained by using the cost
data from economic analyses of the large-scale pro-
grammes in Thailand and Nepal, and country data put
together by Griffith [28] when the GMEP was moving into
the consolidation phase in a number of countries (Table
3). The difference between the Griffith data (range in
2006 USD: 0.45–0.84) and that for Thailand and Nepal
may reflect the fact that for the former data, consolidation
came just after the successful reduction of cases during the
attack phase, whereas the latter data come from the 1980s
when the eradication goal had been abandoned and
countries were struggling with persisting malaria in spe-
cific geographical areas. In 1988, the annual cost of inten-
sive, comprehensive control was estimated at the 2006
USD equivalent of 2.31 per capita [29].
On a per capita basis, these costs look surprisingly mod-
est. However at the time malaria eradication was being
attempted, expenditures absorbed a sizable share of gov-
ernment health expenditure. In India, for instance, Cohn
calculated that the expenditure on eradication during the
campaign was one third of total health expenditure, and
in Nepal, malaria control in the 1960s and 1970s
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accounted for 20–25% of Ministry of Health recurrent
expenditure [3].
Little specific information is available on sources of fund-
ing. In Nepal, Mills [3] found that between 1955 and
1985, external sources funded insecticides, drugs, equip-
ment and vehicles, while the government financed local
costs, primarily salaries. In general, around 56% of costs
were locally financed, though this share depended greatly
on how much insecticide was provided, since this was
quite costly. Evidence in Griffith [28] suggests that this
picture on the balance of internal and external funding
was mirrored elsewhere.
It is commonly said that the need to fund surveillance
adequately was underestimated by the GMEP, and that
the less visible malaria became as a problem, the more dif-
ficult it was to maintain expenditure. Indeed, the Eighth
Report of the Expert Committee on Malaria [30] suggested
that experience indicated that 'a well-operated consolida-
tion mechanism costs, per annum, 65% to 75% of an
attack mechanism'. Griffith noted that 'to the eradication-
ist, the need to maintain financial support at a high level,
when malaria has been reduced to a low level, must often
be seen the supreme fiscal headache surmounting the
large body of administrative and technical problems to be
overcome for a successful termination of the eradication
programme', a point highly pertinent to current discus-
sions about elimination.
Recent analyses of the costs of malaria control began with
the work of the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health (CMH). The CMH estimated the costs of achieving
70% coverage of interventions for the prevention and
treatment of malaria in all countries with GNP per capita
of less than $1,200 in 1999 USD (a total of 83 countries,
not all of which were malaria affected). Total annual costs
(in 2002 USD) of prevention and treatment of adults were
$3,535 m – 5,267 m, or $0.74–1.1 per capita of the total
population [31], plus a share of the $9,414–11,987 m
($1.97–2.50 per capita) cost of treatment of childhood
diseases including malaria. These costs included the direct
capital and recurrent costs of the interventions plus the
support and supervision needed at a district level. Allow-
ing for the costs of broader system strengthening needed
at higher management levels to support malaria control
might double these costs [32]. Kiszewski et al [33] simi-
larly estimated the total costs of scaling-up a set of malaria
control measures, but in the 81 countries most heavily
affected by falciparum malaria. They included both serv-
ice and programme strengthening costs, and 100% cover-
age targets. Total annual costs of fully scaled up services
were $4,468 – 5,660 m (in 2006 USD), or $2.35–2.98 per
capita of populations in falciparum-affected areas.
The most recent estimates are from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation's commissioned projection of resource
needs for the global malaria effort, and the Roll Back
Malaria (RBM) Global Action Plan published in Septem-
ber 2008. The estimate presented at the Malaria Forum in
Seattle was $6 bn annually for implementation costs of
80% coverage in 107 countries covering 3.2 bn people at
risk of falciparum and vivax malaria ($1.88 pc). RBM's
Global Malaria Action Plan estimated the costs of country
implementation of malaria control and elimination strat-
egies to be $5.3 and 6.2 billion ($2008) in 2009 and
2010, respectively, and $5.1 bn per year from 2011 to
2020, for 109 countries and 3.3 bn people at risk, suggest-
ing roughly $1.55 per person [34].
Cost comparisons are fraught with problems. In particu-
lar, the above estimates differ in terms of countries
included, target coverages and costing approaches, and
costs in any specific country setting will vary greatly
Table 3: Historical evidence of the financial costs of the consolidation phase* of malaria elimination.
Country Annual cost per person protected (in 2006 USD) Source
Taiwan 0.45 Griffith 1961 [28]
India 0.50 Griffith 1961 [28]
Sri Lanka 0.74 Griffith 1961 [28]
Indonesia 0.84 Griffith 1961 [28]
Thailand 1.33 Kaewsonthi and Harding 1984 [54]
Nepal 0.64–1.03** Mills 1992 [55]
Source: adapted from Table 4 in [4]; 1984 values updated to 2006 using the US GDP deflator. *Involving surveillance, treatment of cases, and 
spraying when needed; **range represents areas of different endemicity.
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depending on the appropriate mix of interventions.
Nonetheless the studies suggest that around US$1.5–3.0
per capita per year are required to maintain malaria con-
trol efforts. The RBM estimates, which project costs well
into the future, do not anticipate costs falling as a reflec-
tion of elimination successes until after 2020.
Institutional challenges
Malaria eradication campaigns in Asia generally began
when coverage of routine health services was limited. For
example, in Nepal, malaria eradication was the first health
programme to reach into villages, and efforts were not
made to strengthen basic health services until the early
1980s. The vertical nature of malaria eradication pro-
grammes – involving spraying teams and active case
detection and treatment, managed by a self-contained
organization – meant that programmes created and main-
tained were largely independent of the rest of the health
service infrastructure.
Nonetheless, spraying programmes struggled to operate
efficiently. Common problems in countries such as India,
Nepal and Sri Lanka included: delays in starting annual
spraying campaigns, so that spraying occurred after the
rise in numbers of cases at the start of the transmission
season [3]; high levels of refusals by house owners to have
their houses sprayed and replastering of walls following
spraying [35,36]; and shortages of insecticide resulting in
sub-optimal levels of coverage [3], which were aggravated
by increasing reliance on the more expensive and short-
acting insecticides as a result of the development of resist-
ance to DDT. More generally, insecurity, war and armed
political struggles were major obstacles in large areas of
countries [37].
From the 1970s, there was declining external support for
malaria control as enthusiasm waned amongst donors for
providing continuing assistance. With a change in policies
favouring primary health care and decentralization, there
was increasing pressure to integrate malaria control with
other health programmes to capture efficiencies and syn-
ergies. Thus, in Nepal, malaria control was, over time,
integrated with the community health development pro-
gramme, and community health workers were expected to
undertake a number of tasks. Experience with integration
in a number of countries suggests that the efficiency of
malaria control suffered with integration, and also that
multi-purpose workers were poorly trained and supported
to take on a broad range of tasks [37]. Another common
problem was that decentralized services lacked technical
expertise in areas such as malaria and control of other dis-
eases [38].
A further institutional problem was that in some countries
with relatively good control programmes, cross-border
traffic maintained the malaria problem. Although the
Nepalese control programme was not fully effective, it was
more effective than in adjacent Indian districts, and
imported malaria remained a constant problem. In Thai-
land, where control was more efficient, nonetheless bor-
der malaria remained a major problem because of the
circumstances of Cambodia and Myanmar, with flows of
people affected both by conflict and by opportunities for
profitable, but illegal, productive and trading activities,
such as forestry and gem mining. Part of the problem was
also a continuation of malaria in remote and difficult to
reach areas with poor roads. The far-west of Nepal, for
example, was never fully included in the eradication effort
due to problems of physical access.
Recent efforts to scale up malaria control interventions
have taken place in a more complex environment of plu-
ralist health-care delivery systems and ever-expanding
donor initiatives, such as the Roll-Back Malaria Partner-
ship, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
(GFATM), the World Bank Malaria Booster Programme,
and the US President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). Whilst
bringing dramatically expanded resources for malaria
control, this proliferation of global initiatives has placed
new demands on programme managers in terms of coor-
dination, reporting and accountability requirements.
The challenges currently facing malaria control are in
many ways indistinguishable from those facing current
health systems as a whole. Drawing on a framework devel-
oped for the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health to classify the health system constraints to scaling-
up priority health interventions [7,8], Table 4 sets out the
levels at which these constraints operate and gives exam-
ples of the problems in relation to scaling-up malaria con-
trol interventions. Malaria-related constraints can be
identified at all levels, from household and community-
level constraints on demand for effective interventions,
through to civil service rules and other cross-sector gov-
ernment policies that restrict efforts to improve the remu-
neration and performance management of health
workers.
Of particular relevance in the current climate is the issue
of whether intensified malaria control initiatives should
be vertically organized, working within malaria-specific
management and supply structures, or integrated with the
broader health system. The vertical approach has the
advantage of providing focused technical input and
resources and, potentially, quicker progress in the specific
disease area. However, a variety of experiences have dem-
onstrated how such approaches can lead to duplication of
effort, distortions among programmes, and disruptions in
the delivery of routine health services [8]. Travis et al have
argued that a health systems approach to addressing the
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root problems which are shared by all disease control pro-
grammes is potentially more efficient [39].
The horizontal/vertical discourse has recently evolved
towards advocacy for a "diagonal" approach [40] in which
disease-specific priorities and resources are used to drive
through health system improvements which tackle shared
problems such as human resources, health financing, drug
supply and information systems. However, there is so far
limited evidence of the success of such approaches.
Implications for malaria elimination and 
intensified control
What can be drawn from the bodies of evidence reviewed
above with respect to the economic, financial and institu-
tional challenges that face the renewed call for elimina-
tion and intensified control?
The economic return from malaria elimination/control
As is clear above, the bulk of the cost benefit analyses date
from the eradication era, and suggest that the benefits of
malaria elimination and intensified control exceed costs.
However, there are a number of caveats with respect to the
relevance of these findings for the present day. Firstly,
BCRs for elimination remain largely hypothetical – they
are mostly prospective, and have not been followed up
later to assess how close to the truth they came. It is highly
likely they were optimistic with respect to both the level of
costs and the period over which continued control would
be necessary. The retrospective assessment by Mills of
malaria control in Nepal [14-16] is the only study that
sought to explore, within a country setting, what benefits
might reasonably associated with malaria control. In
addition, the Gallup and Sachs and McCarthy et al studies
demonstrate that countries with less malaria historically
had higher rates of economic growth, but there are ques-
tions on how appropriate it is to extrapolate this conclu-
sion to the control of malaria in the high-burden
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
Secondly, the early literature is preoccupied with the
implications of elimination for population growth. Again,
there appears to have been no retrospective assessment of
whether the fears were well grounded or not, but there is
now greater understanding of the relationship between
improved health and population demographic change,
such that demographic implications are not now
employed as a reason to ignore disease burden.
Thirdly, the underlying cost structures of malaria control
are likely to be somewhat different. It might be expected
that the relative prices of physical and human inputs to
malaria control are now very different from those during
the era of eradication, though this remains a subject for
further investigation. The range of interventions is now
broader, encompassing long-lasting insecticidal mosquito
nets as well as intermittent treatment options for pregnant
women, infants and children, and the delivery modes are
Table 4: Current challenges to scaling-up malaria control.
I. Community and household Limited demand for malaria prevention and treatment due to lack of information, high cost, or 
physical inaccessibility; lack of community engagement in malaria control.
II. Health service delivery Shortage and maldistribution of appropriately qualified staff; inadequate supply of consumables 
including malaria drugs, diagnostic tests, insecticide; lack of equipment and infrastructure 
including poor accessibility of health services; poor-quality diagnosis and treatment in public 
and private sectors; weak technical guidance, programme management and supervision; 
inequities in programme reach.
III. Health sector policy and strategic management Weak national malaria control programmes; weak drug policies and supply systems; inadequate 
communication with the private sector and regulation of retail drug sales and fake drugs; weak 
incentives to use inputs efficiently and respond to user needs and preferences; reliance on 
external funding reduces flexibility and ownership; donor practices overload country 
management capacity
IV. Public policies cutting across sectors Taxes and tariffs on import of malaria-related commodities; decentralization policies place 
responsibility where technical capacity is weak; inflexible government bureaucracy (civil service 
rules and remuneration; centralized management); poor availability of communication and 
transport infrastructure
V. Environmental and contextual characteristics Governance and overall policy framework: corruption, weak government, weak rule of law and 
enforceability of contracts; political instability and insecurity; low priority attached to social 
sectors; weak structures for public accountability; lack of free press. Physical environment: 
climatic and geographic predisposition to disease; physical environment unfavourable to service 
delivery.
Adapted from [7].
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more varied. Social marketing approaches for example,
and piggy-backing interventions on the retail sector, are
not delivery modes that were previously available. The
much greater availability and use of private sources of
treatment increases household costs, but might be
expected to reduce the impact of malaria elimination and
control on health. As Cohn argued, it is possible that, in
some settings, most of the health gains associated with
elimination may have been, or can be, captured through
ongoing control. This would imply that the key compari-
son is financial – the net costs of control versus the net
costs of elimination.
Finally, in many areas, malaria was associated with certain
environmental features, which have changed with
increased population growth: deforestation, expanded
cultivation and urbanization. In addition, increased
incomes and related socio-economic development have
improved housing and sleeping conditions, knowledge of
personal protection measures, and ability to purchase
health care. Thus the potential for malaria transmission,
and also for malaria reduction, is now less in many areas.
This changes both costs and benefits.
Financial challenges
Although the cost estimates presented above are approxi-
mate, it seems that expenditure of the order of a few dol-
lars per capita is likely to be required for intensified
control measures, though additional funding would be
required to finance the high-level systems support neces-
sary for interventions to be delivered efficiently and at
scale. Given the large number of people at risk of malaria,
such per capita sums translate into very substantial total
financial requirements.
A much greater challenge, however, is likely to be main-
taining donor and national government support for the
period of time required for elimination, or merely to
maintain high coverage of control measures over time.
The history of immunization demonstrates how interna-
tional efforts have waxed and waned over time, and the
history of malaria eradication itself demonstrates its vul-
nerability to decreasing interest over time. Funding mech-
anisms are needed that protect countries from short-term
fluctuations.
Institutional challenges
In environments such as the bulk of sub-Saharan Africa,
where expanded coverage of existing control measures is
the immediate target, the main challenges are those out-
lined earlier: overcoming the constraints at household,
health-service delivery and policy levels, and at cross-sec-
toral level, including issues of governance and accounta-
bility.
The evidence on the costs and effects of strengthening
intervention delivery and coverage through a health sys-
tems approach remains limited, though some promising
approaches have been identified [41], which also have the
potential to strengthen malaria control activities. For
example, improved performance at local level has been
obtained by strengthening structures of accountability to
communities and introducing mechanisms to ensure that
users have a voice in the local health system and can influ-
ence priorities. In Burkina Faso, participation by commu-
nity representatives in public primary health care clinics
increased coverage of key interventions. In the area of
human resources, there have been some successful experi-
ences of using mixes of financial and non-financial incen-
tives to improve provider performance. In terms of
organization of service delivery, there are also some posi-
tive examples. Contracting NGOs to deliver primary care
services in Cambodia is one example.
Of particular relevance to malaria control is the increased
pluralism and complexity of contemporary health sys-
tems compared to those existing in the eradication era,
particularly with respect to the volume of private provid-
ers of all types. Governments cannot now ignore the role
that private providers play in malaria treatment, for exam-
ple, and need to identify ways to work with private provid-
ers to improve the quality of services they provide.
Although a number of promising approaches have been
identified, the evidence remains patchy [42]. The contem-
porary international environment is also much more
complex than in the days of the GMEP – there are many
more players, with the possibility for conflicting guidance
and certainly competition between various disease con-
trol initiatives for scarce resources, such as trained health
workers.
In those parts of the world where elimination of malaria
is technically feasible in the short- to medium-term, epi-
demiological and technical differences will influence the
institutional responses needed at different levels of the
system (Table 5). First, changing epidemiology will affect
people's perception of the severity of illness and the
acceptability of control measures. For instance, as the per-
ceived risk of malaria diminishes, support for vector con-
trol measures, such as spraying, may wane. Effective
communication and community engagement will be
needed to ensure continued high coverage of interven-
tions. In addition, while the current focus on reaching the
poor with interventions is driven by equity concerns,
elimination will bring an additional epidemiological
impetus to providing services in these communities and
possibly fuel efforts to reach isolated communities more
effectively.
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Second, emphasis at the service-delivery level is likely to
shift from passive detection and case management to
more active screening and treatment strategies, requiring
strong surveillance systems. This will be facilitated by
modern communications, which will make it easier to
transmit information about disease outbreaks and elicit
appropriate control responses. Means of including private
providers in these systems will need to be identified.
Third, at the health policy and management level, struc-
tures within health ministries will need to adapt to allow
for more effective communication and coordination
between malaria control programmes and other technical
programmes, in order to ensure that technical guidelines,
such as those for IMCI, are adapted to a shifting disease
burden. The growing body of evidence about diverse ways
of organizing service delivery, and greater awareness of
the need to combine the technical expertise of disease
control programmes with an integrated approach to serv-
ice delivery, should help to support effective and sus-
tained control programmes.
At the fourth level, intersectoral collaboration will be
needed to develop appropriate mechanisms to manage
cross-border outbreaks. New financial mechanisms will
be needed to ensure that adequate resources for elimina-
tion are allocated, and that these allocations to malaria
control are protected as the perceived risk diminishes. Sus-
taining political and popular support for malaria eradica-
tion is likely to be a major challenge.
A research agenda
Research in recent years has concentrated on developing
the evidence-base on the cost-effectiveness of malaria con-
trol interventions, in order to demonstrate that malaria
control represents value for money, and on evaluating
approaches for scaling-up these interventions. The goal of
eradication, however, changes the context and poses
somewhat different needs for evidence.
Firstly, the question of the allocative efficiency of malaria
eradication assumes centre stage. If substantial resources
are to be devoted to malaria over the long term, then the
case for these investments can be greatly strengthened if it
can be shown that benefits will substantially exceed costs.
Recent work has made a persuasive case that the effects of
malaria are such that a macro-economic framework is
needed to assess costs and benefits. The value of this
approach is also supported by recent work on the macro-
economic consequences of antimicrobial resistance [43].
A key priority is to develop a dynamic macro-economic
model which can explore the economic consequences of
malaria eradication and differing levels of control, taking
into account recent evidence on the broader economic
consequences of malaria, including its impact on the
intellectual development of children [44].
Such modelling, however, needs to be underpinned by a
greater volume of research on the connections between
malaria control and economic development. Evidence is
still very limited on many of the potential benefits of
reduced malaria, such as human capital improvement,
labour supply, agricultural production, foreign invest-
ment and tourism.
Secondly, there are large information needs related to the
costs and consequences of control and eradication. Virtu-
ally none of the existing literature on the cost-effectiveness
of interventions takes into account the impact of scale on
cost-effectiveness, or the cost-effectiveness of combina-
tions of interventions. Priorities for research include:
Table 5: Additional challenges for elimination and intensified control.
I. Community and household Reduced acceptability of control measures such as house spraying as perceived malaria risk 
falls; acceptability of new interventions such as mass screening and treatment; changed 
behavioural response to illness as age distribution of malaria changes and malaria share of 
fevers declines; access barriers to reaching isolated (geographically, socially, etc.) communities 
for outbreak control
II. Health service delivery Need for effective disease surveillance and response systems
III. Health sector policy and strategic management Strengthened links between technical programmes (e.g. malaria and MCH programmes) to 
ensure revised guidance for appropriate management of non-malaria fever and greater burden 
of disease in adults
IV. Public policies cutting across sectors Legal frameworks and border controls for coordinating action in cross-border outbreaks; 
financing mechanisms that allow for and protect commitments to malaria control
V. Environmental and contextual characteristics Ensuring sustained political and financial commitment to eradication at all levels; structures of 
public accountability that will support such commitment
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 the cost-effectiveness of interventions as the level of
transmission changes over time (employing dynamic
cost-effectiveness modelling)
 the cost-effectiveness of packages of interventions,
including evidence about the extent of economies of
scope and/or synergies in effectiveness
 the cost-effectiveness of "new" strategies such as active
case detection and mass screening and treatment after the
intensified control phase is over, including modelling to
determine the optimal transmission levels at which to
change strategy
 the incremental cost-effectiveness of proceeding to elim-
ination once a high level of control has been achieved.
Thirdly, there is a substantial research agenda around
extending coverage of interventions and issues of service
delivery. Eradication will require malaria control pro-
grammes to reach into all parts of a country. Research is
needed to identify new ways to extend the reach of
malaria control interventions, to enable programmes to
extend their coverage of marginalized and physically iso-
lated populations. This should include examination of the
costs and effectiveness of multipurpose programmes com-
pared with malaria-specific ones, and the appropriate
combination of disease-specific and integrated service-
delivery models to allow both effective disease control
and to maximize the positive impacts on the health sys-
tem as a whole.
Fourthly, research is needed on the processes involved in
formulating and implementing malaria control and erad-
ication policies, at both international and national levels.
Gramiccia and Beales [37] commented that 'one of the
important shortcomings of the eradication programme
was the incapacity or unwillingness of some governments
to support and manage their own national programme.
This applies particularly to those governments that had
been pushed into eradication by international pressure or
incentives'. Policy analysis research at national and global
levels can help to understand the political landscape, and
identify how political strategies might be crafted to enable
longer-term political support in both donor countries and
endemic countries. Research on the processes of policy
implementation can help to understand why agreed poli-
cies can fail to be implemented at the local level, and help
design improved implementation processes.
Finally, research is needed on the financing issues, includ-
ing approaches to protecting long-term financing com-
mitments, ways to ring-fence resources (at national and
global level) over time and methods for estimating
resource requirements and how they might change over
time.
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